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Abstract: Ukraine is in the process of a serious demographic transition – a dramatic decline of the population 
along with its rapid aging.  After a brief overview of demographic trends and recent labor market trends in 
Ukraine, this paper analyzes the implications of demographic changes for the labor market, in particular on 
labor supply and productivity.  The labor force projections are estimated by combining population projections 
in 2010-2060 calculated by the UN with the labor force participation rate projections for 2010-2020 developed 
by the ILO and by applying several scenarios on the development of labor force participation rates over the 
2021-2060 period.  The projections suggest that, even under very optimistic scenario assuming an increase in 
labor force participation rates to over 90 percent in all 5-year age groups from 25 to 64 years by 2060, Ukraine 
is not likely to prevent significant decline of the labor force.  The simulations of labor productivity 
demonstrate that it is possible to cushion the negative impact of these demographic changes on the living 
standards of population but significant productivity and technological improvements are needed.  The 
Government of Ukraine can play a significant role in mitigating some of the negative effects of population 
aging through a three-layered policy approach: the fundamentals that support productivity and employment 
growth, adequate labor policies, and specific policies that induce higher labor force participation of older 
workers (active aging). 
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1. Introduction 
 
During the past 20 years, Ukraine has been suffering from dramatic changes in population size 
and its age structure.  The Ukrainian population decreased from 51.6 million in 1990 to 45.4 
million in 2010 and is expected to decrease to 34 million in 2060
2
.  Between 1990 and 2010, the 
working-age population declined at an average annual rate of 0.33 percent, while the elderly 
population aged 65 years and older grew at an average annual rate of 0.64 percent.  In the next 
fifty years (until 2060), the working-age population is expected to decline further by about 0.97 
percent annually.  In the same period, the elderly population is expected to grow on average by 
0.48 percent annually.  As a result, the proportion of the elderly in the total population increased 
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from 12.2 percent in 1990 to 15.5 percent in 2010 and will increase to 26.1 percent in 2060.  If 
gender- and age-specific labor force participation rates are kept constant, the labor force in 
Ukraine is projected to shrink by more than 39 percent by 2060. 
Population aging
3
 is already seriously affecting many countries and regions, including Japan, 
Western and Eastern Europe, Australia, New Zealand, Uruguay, Argentina, etc., and it is expected 
to be a growing concern in a number of other countries in the near future.  This study focuses on 
Ukraine which is more vulnerable to the negative impacts of an aging and shrinking population 
than many other regions in Europe or elsewhere.  First, the country is still undergoing economic, 
political and social transformations triggered by the Soviet Union’s collapse and sluggish reforms 
in transition to a new economic and political system.  So, the multiple challenges faced by aging 
countries in terms of maintaining and improving living standards, productivity and social 
cohesion are especially formidable in countries like Ukraine where aging takes place against the 
backdrop of weak institutions, structural weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the economy, political 
instability and low level of trust among the population.  The interaction of the demographic 
transition with economic, political and social transitions makes Ukraine’s experience especially 
challenging and attractive for study. 
Second, aging in Ukraine takes place from below and not from above, i.e. mainly due to a 
decline in fertility and continuous outmigration of the working-age population rather than due to a 
huge increase in life expectancy rates as in developed countries.  Besides, there is a huge 
difference in life expectancy between men and women.  This limits the possibility to tackle the 
challenge of Ukraine's aging population by significantly increasing the retirement age, especially 
for men, as it might shorten considerably the work-free time in old age and so is not the best 
option for policymakers. 
Third, compared with higher-income aging countries, Ukraine has fewer financial resources for 
mitigating the negative impacts of population aging on the labor market, the social protection and 
health systems.  At the same time, slow progress in the development of financial markets which 
are well needed to introduce mandatory funded second-pillar pension scheme in Ukraine 
aggravates the difficulties of dealing with population aging. 
Fourth, the jobs challenge driven by shrinking and aging population in Ukraine is amplified by 
relatively low levels of labor force participation and labor mobility, poor productivity 
performance and the ineffective use of available human capital.  As a result, Ukraine faces a 
vicious circle: the decreasing pool of available working-age individuals puts significant pressure 
on Ukrainian firms and potential foreign investors looking for skilled workers.  Skills of the 
more abundant older cohorts who have completed their education before the transition are less 
appropriate and less well rewarded in the new market environment.  At the same time, 
decreasing young cohorts and ineffective use of their skills reduce the innovative capacity of local 
firms.  This seriously undermines Ukraine’s competitiveness and investment attractiveness 
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under conditions of the global move to a more knowledge-based and innovation-led economy. 
Besides, the growing elderly population is placing enormous fiscal pressure that might be 
accommodated by ad hoc measures with an increase of contribution and tax rates among those 
who participate in the formal economy.  If so, this will ultimately lead to higher labor costs and a 
double burden on formally employed working-age individuals and formal firms that could create 
incentives for more individuals and firms to exit into the shadow economy and be a source of 
social strain.  In the end, the country may fall into a fiscal trap with a lack of socioeconomic 
opportunities for youth.  Aging can also make the population less mobile, both professionally 
and geographically.  Such negative developments may hinder further economic growth, worsen 
living standards and adversely impact intergenerational relations and social cohesion.  This, in 
turn, can lead to a reversal of recent positive trends in fertility and life expectancy and, as a 
consequence, to more acute aging-related problems for the labor market and economic 
development of Ukraine. 
On the other hand, Ukraine has more opportunities than many other aging societies to adjust to 
the challenges of an aging and shrinking population through increasing labor force participation 
and productivity levels by bringing hitherto idle youth and adults into the workplace, encouraging 
more internal migration and professional mobility of workers, improving and better utilizing their 
knowledge and skills.  There is also some scope for increasing productivity through 
technological and organizational innovations and the reallocation of firms and workers from less 
to more productive activities. 
Yet this favorable scenario may come true only if Ukrainian policymakers manage to develop 
and effectively implement a multifaceted approach to the problems being created by the aging 
population.  A prerequisite is to create a policy environment that is conducive to sustained job 
creation and productivity growth.  The fundamentals including macroeconomic stability, an 
enabling business environment, human capital, the rule of law and modern infrastructure should 
be a solid foundation for Ukraine’s job policy.  Effective labor policies including the measures 
that improve skills matching, promote labor mobility and effectively protect the most vulnerable 
workers are important not only for supporting efficiently functioning labor markets but also for 
confronting the aging issue.  Finally, it is necessary to support creation of more jobs for 
development, i.e. those that bring positive spillovers with respect to living standards, productivity 
gains and social cohesion, given the country context.  In Ukraine, a country with a rapidly 
changing workforce, jobs that maximize the years of economic activity and healthy life of 
population are likely to have large development payoffs.  Improving fairness in the Ukrainian 
labor market is another priority task for rebuilding social cohesion in Ukraine’s society and 
increasing the development payoff of jobs. 
The next section presents an overview of the current and future demographic trends in Ukraine, 
whereas section 3 examines the labor market trends.  Section 4 analyses implications of 
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demographic changes for the labor market.  It directly addresses the potential impact of 
population aging on labor supply and labor productivity leaving aside the implications on public 
finance and social protection of the elderly, health care and long-term care, savings and financial 
markets.  The paper concludes with a discussion of policy options for addressing aging-related 
concerns in the Ukrainian labor market. 
 
2. Demographic trends in Ukraine: Basic facts 
 
Ukraine has one of the highest population declines in the world.  According to the UN World 
Population data
4
, it shared the second position with Bulgaria and Georgia in terms of an average 
annual rate of population decline in 2005-2010 (0.6 percent) among 196 countries with a 
population of 100,000 or more in 2009.  The Ukraine’s population decreased from 51.6 million 
in 1990 to 45.4 million in 2010, representing a loss of more than 12 percent.  In the next 50 
years, it is expected to decrease to 34 million under the medium-fertility variant and to 27.4 
million under the low-fertility variant (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Total population by variant of projections, 1990-2060 
 
Source: UN (2011). 
Note: Data refer to total population, both sexes combined, as of 1 July of the corresponding year.  
In 1990-2010 these are UN estimates, in 2011-2050 they refer to population projections 
with four variants depending on the assumption about fertility trends. 
 
Dramatic changes in the size of population have been accompanied with changes in its age 
structure.  Between 1990 and 2010, the working-age population (aged 15 to 64 years) declined 
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at an average annual rate of 0.33 percent, with an overall loss of 2.3 million people (Table 1).  In 
the same period, the elderly population grew at an average annual rate of 0.64 percent and 
increased by 706 thousand people.  In the next fifty years (until 2060), the working-age 
population is expected to decline further by about 0.97 percent annually, whereas the elderly 
population is expected to grow on average by 0.48 percent annually.  As a result, the proportion 
of the elderly in the total population increased from 12.2 percent in 1990 to 15.5 percent in 2010 
and will increase to about 26.1 percent in 2060 (under the medium-fertility variant).  The natural 
consequence of aging is an increase in the old-age dependency ratio, i.e. the number of people 
older than 65 years relative to those of working age (15–64 years).  By 2060, this ratio is 
expected to increase twofold to 45.3 percent (Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Population dynamics by age group and old-age dependency ratio, 
1990–2060 
Indicator Period 
Age group 
Total 
0-14 years 15-64 years 65+ years 
Population 
(thousand) 
1990 11065.8 34261.4 6317.7 51644.9 
2010 6452.8 31971.8 7023.7 45448.3 
2035 5784.6 25597.5 7863.7 39245.7 
2060 5567.5 19622.5 8896.0 34086.0 
Average 
annual growth 
rate (%) 
1990-2010 – 2.55 – 0.33 0.64 – 0.60 
2010-2060 – 0.29 – 0.97 0.48 – 0.57 
Proportion of 
age group in 
total population 
(%) 
1990 21.4 66.3 12.2 100 
2010 14.2 70.3 15.5 100 
2035 14.7 65.2 20.0 100 
2060 16.3 57.6 26.1 100 
Old-age 
dependency 
ratio (%) 
1990 18.4 
2010 22.0 
2035 30.7 
2060 45.3 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from UN (2011). 
Note: In 2011-2060 population projections with medium-fertility variant are used.  The old-age 
dependency ratio is the ratio of the number of elderly people at an age when they are 
generally economically inactive (i.e. aged 65 and over), compared to the number of people 
of working age (i.e. 15-64 years old). 
 
Ukraine can be classified as “already old” because it has surpassed the threshold of 10 percent 
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of population in the 65 and older age group a long time ago (Chawla et al., 2007).  But the 
process of population aging speeded up considerably in the last years and it is expected to 
continue as fertility rates in Ukraine have been much below replacement levels since the early 
1990-s.  This shift toward the population structure dominated by older people rather than young 
is a sign of the third demographic transition.  It is experienced by many countries in the world 
which have moved from a regime with high fertility and mortality to the one with lower levels of 
fertility and mortality. 
 
Table 2. Life expectancy and fertility trends in Ukraine and selected developed 
countries, 1950–2010 
Country 
Median 
age 
Life expectancy at birth for both sexes 
combined (years) 
Total fertility (children per woman) 
2010 
1950-
1955 
1970-
1975 
1990-
1995 
1995-
2000 
2000-
2005 
2005-
2010 
1950-
1955 
1970-
1975 
1990-
1995 
1995-
2000 
2000-
2005 
2005-
2010 
Japan 44.9 62.17 73.14 79.45 80.48 81.83 82.73 3.00 2.13 1.48 1.37 1.30 1.32 
Germany 44.3 67.50 71.00 76.02 77.36 78.69 79.85 2.16 1.64 1.30 1.34 1.35 1.36 
Italy 43.3 66.32 72.14 77.39 78.68 80.20 81.37 2.36 2.35 1.28 1.22 1.25 1.38 
Finland 42.0 66.09 70.82 75.74 77.03 78.27 79.34 3.00 1.62 1.82 1.74 1.75 1.84 
Austria 41.8 66.26 70.67 76.05 77.39 78.82 80.24 2.08 2.04 1.47 1.37 1.39 1.38 
Greece 41.8 65.86 72.34 77.37 77.95 79.03 79.52 2.29 2.32 1.37 1.30 1.28 1.46 
Switzerland 41.6 69.34 73.71 78.03 79.18 80.69 81.81 2.31 1.87 1.54 1.48 1.41 1.46 
Belgium 41.1 68.37 71.63 76.39 77.49 78.18 79.77 2.34 2.02 1.61 1.60 1.69 1.79 
Portugal 41.0 60.03 68.17 74.68 75.85 77.33 78.59 3.10 2.83 1.51 1.48 1.45 1.36 
Netherlands 40.8 71.93 74.11 77.26 77.85 78.68 80.20 3.05 2.06 1.58 1.60 1.73 1.75 
Ukraine 39.4 65.94 70.13 68.74 67.36 67.59 67.54 2.81 2.16 1.64 1.23 1.15 1.39 
Source: UN (2011). 
 
However, Ukraine is aging in a way which is not similar to Western Europe or Japan.  Life 
expectancies in developed countries have been gradually increasing since the 1950-s to 80 years 
and more (Table 2).  In Ukraine, life expectancy slightly increased between 1950 and 1970 but 
after reaching a peak in 1965–1970 (71.3 years) it declined to 67.5 years in 2005–2010.  
According to the national statistical office – State Statistics Service of Ukraine – recent trends 
look more optimistic than those provided by the UN: life expectancy at birth increased from 
67.96 years in 2004 to 71.15 years in 2012.  Nevertheless, it is still much below than in 
developed countries.  Furthermore, Ukrainians are not only dying younger than the nationals of 
higher income countries but also have fewer years lived in full health as documented by a fairly 
low level of health adjusted life expectancy (World Bank, 2009). 
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The second difference is that a decline in fertility rates to below replacement levels began in 
Ukraine much later (in the early 1990-s) than in Japan or Western European countries (mainly 
since the mid-1970-s), but it has been much more pronounced.  In 2000–2005, Ukraine ranked 
third in the world after China Hong Kong SAR and China Macao SAR in terms of the lowest 
fertility rate over the five-year period. 
Following the categorization of aging into four types
5
, populations in Japan and Western 
Europe are aging both from below and above with compensation.  Aging in Ukraine occurs 
primarily from below and results in significant population losses due to low birth and fertility 
rates, relatively high mortality and morbidity among the working-age population (particularly 
men) and emigration of working-age adults and their families (ETF, 2009). 
Another notable observation is that female-male differentials in life expectancies are much 
higher in Ukraine than in high-income countries.  According to the estimates of the State 
Statistics Service of Ukraine in 2012, Ukrainian women are expected to live almost 10 years 
longer than men (76.02 years compared to 66.11 years).  Excessively high and premature 
mortality of men compared to women results in a significant distortion in the gender structure of 
the population, particularly in older age groups (ETF, 2009).  Hence, aging of population in 
Ukraine is accompanied with its feminization that calls on policymakers to consider the 
perspective of gender as well as age when developing and implementing effective interventions. 
 
3. Recent labor market developments in Ukraine 
 
3.1 Employment trends 
Total employment increased steadily during 2001–2008, and the share of employed persons in 
the adult population increased from 55.4 to 59.3 percent (Figure 2)
6
.  The economic and 
financial crisis which reached Ukraine in the late 2008 resulted in the significant employment 
losses, of about 780,800 jobs.  While Ukraine stood out with a strong negative GDP growth rate 
in 2009 (-14.8 percent), its employment contraction (-3.7 percent) was in line with many 
countries that witnessed much milder economic declines.  A significant share of employment 
adjustment, hence, took place through internal mechanisms within firms such as shortened 
working hours, increased use of wage arrears and administrative leaves.  Despite a slight 
increase in total employment in 2010-2012, it has not yet recovered to the pre-crisis levels yet.  
At the same time, due to a rapidly shrinking working-age population, employment rate reached a 
historic high of 59.7 percent in 2012. 
Ukraine experienced unprecedented structural changes not only in the age composition of the 
population, but also in employment.  The agricultural and industrial sectors experienced reduced 
shares in total employment (Figure 3), as employment in these sectors has contracted by about 20 
percent and 28 percent, respectively, since 2000.  Significant employment losses in agriculture 
106  O. KUPETS 
 
 
Figure 2. Employment of population aged 15–70 years, 2000–2012 
 
Source: State Statistics Service of Ukraine (based on the LFS data). 
 
Figure 3. Sectoral composition of employment in Ukraine, 2000–2012 
 
Source: State Statistics Service of Ukraine (based on the LFS data), own calculations. 
Note: Public services include education, health care and social work, and public administration. 
 
and industry were more than offset by substantial gains in financial intermediation (an increase of 
95.2 percent between 2000 and 2012), trade, repair, hotels and restaurants (56.8 percent), and real 
estate, rental, and business activities (47.4 percent).  As a result, the market services sector 
experienced a huge increase in its share before the crisis, followed by stabilization at about 46.6 
percent (Figure 4).  The largest sector in terms of employment is trade, repair, hotels and 
restaurants, which accounted for 24 percent of total employment in 2012.  It is also one of two 
sectors (the second is real estate, rental and other business activities) that grew in 2010-2012 and 
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recovered to the pre-crisis level in terms of employment. 
 
Figure 4. Changes in the occupational composition of employment in Ukraine, 2000 and 
2012 
 
Source: State Statistics Service of Ukraine (based on the LFS data). 
 
Interestingly, the reforms initiated by the President V. Yanukovych and the Government in 2010 
to cut expenditures in the public sector but improve the service delivery, including the 
administration reform aimed at reducing the number of public administration officials at all levels, 
rationalization of the school network system in view of decreasing population of school-age 
children, and the medical reform aimed at improving the quality of health care in an aging but 
shrinking society, have not resulted in significant employment losses.  As a consequence, public 
services accounted for 20 percent of total employment in 2012 which is even higher than before 
the economic crisis. 
Following employment cuts in industry and agriculture, the share of wage and salaried workers 
fell sharply, from around 90.1 percent in 2000 to 81.2 percent in 2012.  These losses were 
counterbalanced by a double increase in the share of own-account workers (from 8.1 to 17.4 
percent), but it mainly happened due to self-employment in subsistence agriculture, petty trade 
and some other low productivity, small-scale and usually unregistered activities.  Most 
self-employed individuals were forced to create jobs for themselves due to a lack of formal wage 
employment and other alternatives rather than being attracted by opportunities, and therefore 
these are mainly “necessity entrepreneurs”. According to EBRD (2011), they are less likely to 
innovate, generate knowledge spillovers and contribute to the economic growth than “opportunity 
entrepreneurs”. 
The hypothesis about the widespread “necessity entrepreneurship” in Ukraine may be also 
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supported by the negative trends in the occupational structure of employment.  The share of 
unskilled jobs in total employment increased from 17.7 to 23.4 percent between 2000 and 2012 
(Figure 4), and the number of unskilled jobs increased by 31.6 percent.  Employment of service 
workers and shop and market sales workers increased by 33.3 percent.  Other occupational 
groups that experienced employment gains but much smaller than in the above groups are 
professionals (14.3 percent) and senior officials/ managers (10.1 percent). 
Overall, the share of white-collar and office jobs (the top four occupational groups) fell from 
39.2 to 37.1 percent, mainly due to considerable reduction of jobs for technicians and clerks.  
The share of blue-collar jobs (groups 6-8) also decreased significantly, which is in line with 
observed employment losses in industry and agriculture.  Skilled agricultural and fishery 
workers experienced the most severe reduction of employment opportunities: the number of 
employed persons in this occupational group has decreased from 617,000 to 183,000 since 2000.  
Most rural residents dismissed from bankrupt collective agricultural firms (kolkhozes) and having 
no other opportunities were forced to engage in subsistence farming cultivating small pieces of 
land near their houses and selling some part of grown products on markets to survive.  As a 
result, the incidence of informal employment in rural areas increased to 89.1 percent in 2012. 
Strikingly, informal employment grew also in urban areas and in Ukraine as a whole, 
despite a strong economic growth before 2009 (Figure 5).  Analysis of informality rates by 
age groups reveals that the highest incidence of informal employment is typical of the oldest 
age group, i.e. persons aged from 60 to 70 years (56 percent in 2009).  High incidence of 
informal employment among the elderly in urban areas can be attributed to a fairly low 
statutory retirement age in Ukraine (55 years for women and 60 years for men), low pension 
replacement rates and limited employment opportunities in the formal sector; a very high 
incidence of informal employment among older workers in rural areas is mainly explained by 
the lack of alternatives to subsistence farming and small-scale informal activities in rural 
areas (Kupets, 2011). 
Widespread informal employment contributes to the violation of core workers’ rights in 
such aspects as job security, timely and reasonable remuneration for work done, access to 
fringe benefits, age and gender equality, initial employment for young people, and 
employment of individuals according to their skills and qualifications.  However, due to an 
extensive use by private employers of various schemes to cheat workers and ignore their core 
rights formal employment does not always guarantee better working conditions either.  
Besides, wages are fairly low on average and unevenly differentiated across sectors, regions 
and individual characteristics.  Specific adjustment mechanisms such as wage arrears and 
“envelope wages” (underdeclared income) which are frequently used by Ukrainian 
employers in relation to selected categories of workers accentuate these problems (Kupets et 
al., 2012). 
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Figure 5. Incidence of informal and non-standard employment over the business-cycle, 
2004-2012 
 
Source: State Statistics Service of Ukraine (GDP growth and incidence of informal employment) 
and author’s calculations based on the LFS data (incidence of non-standard employment). 
Note: Non-standard employment includes informally employed workers (regardless their 
employment status) and wage employees engaged in at least one type of part-time work, 
temporary work, or multiple jobholding. 
 
As Figure 5 shows, non-standard or vulnerable employment which includes not only informally 
employed workers but also wage employees engaged in at least one type of part-time work, 
temporary work, or multiple jobholding, is also quite widespread in Ukraine
7
.  The number of 
people in non-standard employment grew from 5.1 million to 5.6 million between 2004 and 2010.  
Over the same period, the number of people in standard employment decreased from 15.2 million 
to 14.7 million.  As a result, the share of non-standard employment increased from 25.1 percent 
in 2004 to 27.5 percent in 2010.  The observed shift into more non-standard forms of 
employment suggests that generally poor labor market prospects in Ukraine, particularly during 
the economic crisis, have obliged workers to take up any work they could find.  Persistency of 
non-standard employment in the recovery phase reveals that the hypothesis about the cyclical 
nature of vulnerable employment in Ukraine may be rejected. 
Men, youth (15-24 years), older workers (55+ years), rural residents living in the Western, 
Central, and Northern regions, and those holding unskilled jobs in agriculture or construction 
have a significantly higher probability of holding non-standard employment than their 
counterparts which is supported by the estimation results of the multivariate probit model based 
on the LFS data in 2004-2010 (Table A.1 in the Annex).  The fact that men are more prone to 
vulnerable employment in Ukraine contradicts the findings of a similar analysis undertaken by the 
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ILO for 19 European economies and Russia, according to which women, on average, have a 
higher probability of non-standard employment (ILO, 2012).  This may be explained in the 
same way as a higher probability of men to be informally employed (Kupets, 2011; ETF, 2009): 
failure of the economy to create sufficient number of standard jobs with decent working 
conditions to absorb displaced workers from the downsized male-dominated sectors (push effect) 
and higher propensity of men to take up riskier but often better rewarded jobs available in the 
informal economy (pull effect). 
 
Table 3. Job satisfaction in Ukraine, 2000 vs. 2003 vs. 2010 
 Category Score 
UKRAINE February 2000 5.18 
 November 2003 5.53 
 April 2010 5.65 
REGIONS (2010) West 6 
 Center 5.59 
 South 5.19 
 East 5.8 
AGE (2010) 18-29 5.62 
 30-39 5.62 
 40-49 5.72 
 50-59 5.65 
 60+ 6 
EDUCATION (2010) Secondary and secondary vocational 5.44 
 Higher and incomplete higher 6.02 
FINANCIAL STATUS 
(2010) Hardly make ends meet 5.09 
 Enough for buying food 5.63 
 Enough for life but the purchase of durables is difficult 5.55 
 Better off but not able to make some purchases 7.05 
SOCIAL CLASS (2010) Middle 5.9 
 Lower 5.08 
Source: Public opinion poll performed by the Razumkov Centre Sociological Service in April 
2010 (UCEPS, 2010). 
Note: Mean score based on a 10-point scale from 1 (dissatisfied) to 10 (satisfied).  Of all 
respondents over 18 years old, 50.4 percent had a job at the time of the interview. 
 
Hence, despite an increase in the number of employed from 20.175 million people in 2000 to 
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20.354 million in 2012 (see Figure 2 above), the quality of jobs has deteriorated substantially
8
.  
Nevertheless, job satisfaction increased compared with the beginning of 2000 but it is still low 
(Table 3).  It is higher among better-off individuals with higher or incomplete higher education.  
Unexpectedly, residents of poorer Western oblasts appear to be more satisfied with their jobs 
compared with their counterparts living in more prosperous parts of Ukraine.  This regional 
difference in subjective assessments is attributed not so much to the differences in the type of jobs 
as to the differences in the socio-psychological climate in those regions and the general 
satisfaction of people with their life and situation in the country (UCEPS, 2010).  Younger 
people (18-39) are much less satisfied with their jobs than people of retirement age. 
According to the EBRD-World Bank Life in Transition Survey in 2010, Ukraine is among ten 
countries at the bottom of the distribution in terms of the share of employees satisfied with their 
job (Figure 6).  Only 45.3 percent of the employed respondents were satisfied with their job as a 
whole.  Furthermore, less than 30 percent of Ukrainians who were generally satisfied with their 
jobs were satisfied with their financial situation.  By comparison, in Sweden the share of 
workers satisfied with their job and financial situation was about 79 percent.  Many Ukrainians 
are not satisfied with their jobs and financial situation not only because of low wages per se, but 
also because the pay for job is unjust given the workers’ skills and spent efforts and because job 
security is rather low (at least according to working perceptions). 
 
Figure 6. Job satisfaction in Ukraine and selected countries, 2010 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the EBRD-World Bank Life in Transition Survey in 2010. 
Note: The proportion of employed respondents with definite answers who answered “Agree” and 
“Strongly agree” on the question “All things considered, I am satisfied with my job as a whole”. 
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3.2 Unemployment and labor underutilization 
Responding to a favorable economic environment, unemployment rates fell from over 10 
percent in the early 2000-s to 6.4 percent in 2008 (Figure 7).  Decrease in labor demand in the 
wake of the economic crisis induced job destruction and layoffs.  But not all layoffs resulted in 
open unemployment.  On a net basis, about one third of those employees facing job-loss did not 
join the ranks of those looking for employment but withdrew into inactivity, and the 
unemployment level increased by about 533,700 people instead of over 700,000 between 2008 
and 2009.  This was especially the case for males whose overall participation rate declined in 
2009 (from 69.8 to 69.2 percent).  On the contrary, female participation rate increased from 57.5 
percent in 2008 to 58.1 percent in 2009 that might be partly explained by the added worker effect. 
 
Figure 7. Unemployment of population aged 15–70 years, 2000–2012 
 
Source: State Statistics Service of Ukraine (based on the LFS data). 
 
Some groups are more vulnerable to unemployment than others.  These are youth, males and 
urban workers (Table 4).  Although young people have usually acquired more education and 
skills tailored to the new economic environment than their older counterparts, they are facing 
particular difficulties in entering the labor market and in finding a first significant job in their field 
because employers are not willing to recruit workers without any relevant experience and there 
are significant obstacles to self-employment of youth (ETF, 2008; IDSS, 2010).  Besides, actual 
qualifications of young people often do not correspond to those according to diploma because of 
the low quality of post-secondary and tertiary education in Ukraine and slow responsiveness of 
the education and training system to the changing labor market needs.  The lack of part-time 
jobs available to students and poor career guidance may also be an explanation.  In 2012, on 
average 17.3 percent of economically active people aged 15–24 years were unemployed, which is 
significantly higher than in the other age groups (Table 3).  Furthermore, about half of young 
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college and university graduates holding their first significant job after leaving education are 
overqualified for their job (ETF, 2008).  Because so many college and university graduates are 
not finding jobs in their fields of study, the value of tertiary education has come into question as 
the return on investment is not as high as it should be. 
 
Table 4. Labor market indicators by sex, place of residence and age group, 2012 
Indicator Category Total 
By age group 
15–24 25–29 30–39 40–49 50–59 60–70 
Labor force 
participate rate 
Total 64.6 40.7 81.5 84.4 85.3 65.7 24 
Female 58.6 35 71 78.3 83.9 59 21.7 
Male 71.3 46.3 91.7 90.7 86.9 74.1 27.4 
Urban 63.3 37.6 82.1 85.1 85.3 63.8 17 
Rural 67.7 47.2 80 82.8 85.3 70.3 39.8 
Employment 
rate 
Total 59.7 33.7 73.8 78.8 80 62.2 24 
Female 54.8 29.3 65.3 73.6 79 56.5 21.7 
Male 65.2 37.9 82 84 81.1 69.3 27.4 
Urban 58.5 30.5 74.3 79.5 80.3 60.5 17 
Rural 62.7 40.3 72.5 76.9 79.5 66.4 39.8 
Unemployment 
rate 
Total 7.5 17.3 9.5 6.7 6.2 5.3 0.1 
Female 6.4 16.1 8 6 5.8 4.1 0.1 
Male 8.5 18.1 10.6 7.4 6.7 6.5 0 
Urban 7.6 18.9 9.5 6.6 6 5.2 0.1 
Rural 7.4 14.6 9.4 7.1 6.8 5.5 0 
Source: State Statistics Service of Ukraine (based on the LFS data). 
 
Despite the level of education, many young people appear to be trapped into the lower end of 
the labor market, with less secure workplaces, lower wage levels, less on-the-job training, and 
weaker long-term career prospects.  This increases the risk of exclusion and poverty among 
young people and negatively affects social cohesiveness of the society as political upheavals in 
the MENA region have recently shown.  Poor labor outcomes for youth are particularly serious 
in the aging context because of the importance of scarce young cohorts in eventually driving the 
productivity growth needed to compensate for the lack of labor supply. 
Labor force participation rates of older workers (50 years and over) have slightly increased in 
recent years as people of pre-retirement and retirement age have become more active, probably 
due to decreasing pensions in real terms and increasing pressure to support the younger 
generations (children and grandchildren).  However, older people experience significant 
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difficulties in finding any other job once they lose their jobs.  A specific feature of the Ukrainian 
labor market is that the probability of re-employment is low not only for older cohorts, those 
skills were largely built for a different kind of economic system and those productivity might be 
low, but also for the people aged 40-45 years who have lived most of their work life in the new 
economic environment.  This phenomenon may be partly explained by to the widespread age 
discrimination in hiring and insufficient number of decent jobs.  Under such circumstances, the 
major motivation for older workers is to keep their current jobs at whatever cost, rather than to 
invest in human capital and personal development with subsequent movement to more productive 
jobs.  These behavioral patterns clearly restrain productivity growth and effective labor 
reallocation between the sectors.  In addition, they provide less room for prospering of workers 
and moving up the career ladder.  Those who did not manage to keep their jobs are confined to 
low productivity work or discouragement and inactivity. 
 
Table 5. The labor force and its underutilization (in thousands of people aged 15–70 
years), 2000–2012 
Year 
Labor 
force 
Employ
ed 
Unempl
oyed 
(1) 
Discour
aged 
(2) 
Engaged in 
household 
work and 
dependents 
(3) 
Labor underutilization Actual labor force 
participation rate 
(% of total 
population) Number,  
(1)+(2)+(3) 
As % of 
[labor force+ 
+(2) +(3)] 
2000 22830.8 20175.0 2655.8 719.2 1544.9 4919.9 19.6 63.2 
2001 22426.5 19971.5 2455.0 856.5 1481.9 4793.4 19.4 62.3 
2002 22231.9 20091.2 2140.7 820.1 1476.1 4436.8 18.1 61.9 
2003 22171.3 20163.3 2008.0 766.5 1450.9 4225.4 17.3 61.8 
2004 22202.4 20295.7 1906.7 776.5 1702.9 4386.1 17.8 62 
2005 22280.8 20680.0 1600.8 650.9 2006.8 4258.5 17.1 62.2 
2006 22245.4 20730.4 1515.0 460.4 2220.9 4196.3 16.8 62.2 
2007 22322.3 20904.7 1417.6 372.7 2263.0 4053.4 16.2 62.6 
2008 22397.4 20972.3 1425.1 324.3 2295.9 4045.3 16.2 63.3 
2009 22150.3 20191.5 1958.8 436.0 2385.1 4779.9 19.1 63.3 
2010 22051.6 20266.0 1785.6 364.7 2452.2 4602.5 18.5 63.7 
2011 22056.9 20324.2 1732.7 269.8 2551.2 4553.8 18.3 64.3 
2012 22011.5 20354.3 1657.2 253.2 2483.4 4393.8 17.8 64.6 
Source: State Statistics Service of Ukraine (based on LFS), own calculations. 
Note: “Discouraged” includes workers who searched for a job and despaired of success as well as 
those who did not know how or where to look for a job, believed that there were no suitable 
jobs, or those who hoped to come back to previous work, including seasonal workers. 
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Overall, about 4.4 million working-age people who would be most likely able and ready to 
work under favorable conditions did not work in 2012 because of unsuccessful job search 
(unemployment and discouragement) or because of engagement in household work and 
dependency (Table 5).  In addition, according to the official employment statistics based on the 
survey of enterprises and organizations with at least 10 employees, on average 137,900 
employees were on unpaid administrative leave in 2012 and 736,800 workers were employed 
part-time for economic reasons.  Huge labor underutilization seriously affects the growth and 
development potential of the Ukrainian economy.  On the other hand, this labor reserve could 
help meet the aging challenge through an increase in employment and productivity levels by 
bringing hitherto idle youth and adults into the workplace and better utilizing their knowledge and 
skills. 
But the mobility of working-age Ukrainians between labor market statuses is fairly low.  
According to our estimations, 95.6 percent of people who were employed in 2009 were also 
employed in 2010, and 90.8 percent of inactive people in 2009 were also inactive in 2010
9
.  
Much fewer people remained in the status of unemployment over a year but their share increased 
significantly in 2009-2010 compared with earlier years (Table 6).  The probabilities of transition 
from employment to unemployment and from unemployment into employment also reversed 
their positive trends in 2009-2010, suggesting that labor market prospects for Ukrainians 
worsened in the aftermath of the economic crisis.  Inactivity is frequently used as an alternative 
status to unemployment during job losses and voluntary periods out of work: more than 3.5 
percent of those employed in 2009 moved to inactivity in 2010, compared with 0.8 percent of 
those who moved to unemployment, and 21.5 percent of those previously unemployed who 
moved to inactivity.  During 2004-2006, inactivity played an even more important role in 
absorbing both previously employed and unemployed individuals. 
 
Table 6. Transitions between three labor market statuses (percent), 2004-2010 
Period PEE PEU PEN PUE PUU PUN PNE PNU PNN 
2004-2005 92.5 1.0 6.6 45.4 25.6 29.1 12.4 1.3 86.3 
2005-2006 94.8 0.7 4.5 46.9 27.6 25.5 11.4 1.0 87.6 
2006-2007 95.9 0.6 3.5 49.5 25.5 25.1 10.1 0.8 89.2 
2007-2008 96.5 0.5 3.0 50.1 24.5 25.4 7.1 0.7 92.3 
2009-2010 95.6 0.8 3.5 48.1 30.4 21.5 8.5 0.8 90.8 
Source: Own calculations based on LFS data. 
Note: Period 2008-2009 is skipped here because of significant changes in the sample design in 
May 2008.  Pij is the probability of transition from status i in year t to status j in year t+1 
multiplied by 100, where E stands for employment, U for unemployment, and N for inactivity.  
See footnote 6 for definitions of transition probabilities. 
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3.3 Policy implications 
Development of the Ukrainian labor market that seems beneficial at first glance – with a slight 
rise in the employment rate and a relatively low unemployment rate – might actually be quite 
worrisome as some quantitative achievements mask negative qualitative changes.  Formal 
full-time jobs which have been continuously destroyed in many economic sectors are being 
replaced by temporary jobs created in less knowledge-intensive services and medium or 
low-technology manufacturing sectors with high pollution externalities.  Employment growth in 
high-productivity activities remains very limited and mainly confined to the capital city and 
several agglomerations where large firms with foreign investment are concentrated.  So, the 
expected transformation of the labor market in favor of higher skilled jobs is very slow.  
Moreover, new jobs do not always provide income opportunities that are sufficient to measurably 
increase living standards.  As a consequence, employment does not always provide a solid 
pathway out of poverty, and households with a working member could face even more severe 
economic hardship and social deprivation than households relying on social assistance, pension, 
remittances and other income sources.  This may discourage many able-bodied individuals from 
participating in the labor force and finding work, at least in Ukraine, what is not a healthy sign for 
the economy with shrinking and aging population. 
Focus groups discussions and sociological surveys show that limited and unfair access to better 
jobs remains a key problem for many groups, especially for youth and older workers, 
lower-skilled workers, and residents of rural areas, small towns and regions with limited 
employment opportunities (Kupets et al., 2012).  Education, skills, and personal attributes – 
which are considered the individual’s “employability assets” in developed countries – appear to 
be less important for gaining and maintaining employment in Ukraine than personal connections 
and social status (often defined by family background).  Bribery and other forms of corruption 
are quite widespread phenomena in the employment sphere: in order to get a job in the public 
sector (local authorities, tax administration, internal affairs, railway, education, health care, etc.) a 
worker must pay a sizeable bribe or trade in favors, with no guarantees that he/she will be able to 
keep this job for a relatively long time.  Existing unfairness in the labor market, which is 
amplified by widespread corruption and informal schemes, is one of the biggest threats to trust, 
civic engagement, subjective well-being, and social cohesion in Ukraine. 
Hence, the Ukrainian labor market seems to be in a bad equilibrium, which is suboptimal from 
a social point of view: private firms create jobs that are not as good as they should be, many 
people are forced to take up these jobs whereas others prefer not to work at all, and existing jobs 
connect people less than would be socially desirable. 
Such situation calls for urgent changes in the jobs policy approach – away from free-hand 
adjustment of the population to the transformation shocks to concerted actions of the state aimed 
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at boosting labor demand and job quality, supporting inclusion and fairness in the labor market 
through a merit system and assisting vulnerable groups, and rebuilding trust of workers in public 
and private institutions.  Otherwise, Ukrainians will continue to give high preference to a close 
social network (relatives, friends, colleagues, and neighbors) and to the exit option by evading 
taxes, social security contributions and regulations, moving abroad, or withdrawing from the 
labor force.  Alternatively, they will search for new forms of voice to influence the formal 
institutions in the right direction but this might eventually end up in more instability of the system, 
with important implications for the business and investment climate.  Improvements in job 
quality will reward Ukraine with a more solid basis for growth and development, higher living 
standards, better productivity performance, and declining risk of social unrest.  This is 
particularly important for counterbalancing the negative impacts of aging on the labor market and 
the economy. 
 
4. Implications of demographic changes for the Ukrainian labor market 
 
Demographic changes can have direct implications for labor markets through three primary 
channels: labor supply, labor productivity, and labor demand (Chawla et al., 2007, p.73).  
Population aging is expected to increase the share of older workers, who have lower rates of labor 
force participation, and therefore it can lead to a decrease in labor supply and contribute to larger 
labor shortages.  Average labor productivity can decline as older workers are usually less 
productive and less responsive to economic opportunities than their younger colleagues because 
of lower professional and geographical mobility.  Labor demand can change because of shifts in 
the structure of aggregate demand.  For example, due to an aging population and increasing 
demand for long-term and formal care in the EU, health and social care sectors are seen as key 
sectors with high employment potential (EC, 2012). 
 
4.1 Labor supply changes 
In order to assess whether demographic trends will imply serious problems for the future labor 
supply in Ukraine we examine labor force projections for 2010-2060, starting from the base 
scenario with constant age-specific labor force participation rates at 2010 levels.  According to 
our projection exercise, Ukraine is expected to lose 8.4 million workers aged 15 to 64 years 
between 2010 and 2060, or over 39 percent of its 2010 level (see Figure 8).  Younger cohorts 
(15-39 years) will shrink substantially during the 2020-s as the “baby boom” generation born in 
the 1980-s reach 40 years and move to an older age group.  Later, the decline of the labor force 
will be larger in the age group from 40 to 64 years as more and more workers from populous 
cohorts born before the 1990-s demographic crisis will retire or die. 
Following the methodology suggested by J. Koettl and applied in the World Bank Golden  
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Figure 8. Changes in the labor supply by age group (base scenario), 1990–2060 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on population projections from UN (2011) – medium variant 
– and labor force participation rates from ILO (2011) for ten five-year age groups. 
Note: The simulation for 2011-2060 assesses changes in the labor force aged 15-39 and 40-64 
years assuming that age-specific labor force participation rates remain constant in 2011-2060 (at 
the 2010 level).  The size of the labor force is estimated by multiplying the labor force 
participation rate data from the ILO with the population data from the UN by five-year age 
groups and then summing up data for two broad age groups. 
 
Growth Report (2012a)10, we also ran labor force projections with alternative scenarios which 
modify labor force participations rates in various ways to assess the potential to reverse the 
shrinking of the labor force in Ukraine through policy levers.  In addition to the base scenario 
described above, there are five different scenarios: 
 ILO and constant-participation-rate scenario (Scenario 1): as all other scenarios it uses 
the ILO projections of age- and gender-specific labor force participation rates in 2011-2020 
(ILO, 2011)
11
; then it assumes that these participation rates stay constant from 2020 onwards, 
and combines the 2020 participation rates with the UN demographic projections until 2060; 
 convergence to the best performers in Europe (Scenario 2): this scenario assumes that 
participation rates for all age-gender groups in Ukraine will converge by 2060 to the average 
participation rates of European countries with the highest current participation rate for those 
aged 50-74 years (Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and Sweden).  For the years between 2021 
and 2060, this scenario as well as the next three scenarios assumes a linear adjustment over 
time; 
 female-to-male convergence (Scenario 3): this scenario assumes that age-specific 
participation rates of Ukrainian women converge to those of men by 2060; 
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 increased participation rates in older age groups (Scenario 4): this scenario simulates an 
increase in the labor force participation rate in two oldest age groups (55-59 and 60-64 
years) until 2060; 
 the maximum variant (Scenario 5): it combines the effects of the latter three variants. 
Projected age-specific labor force participation rates for both sexes under alternative scenarios 
are provided in Table A.2 in the Annex.  Table 7 below summarizes the projection results by 
presenting changes in the labor force in two broad age groups – 15-39 years and 40-64 years – 
between 2010 and 2060.  It shows that even under very optimistic conditions with a maximum 
variant (Scenario 5) when labor force participation rates would exceed 90 percent in all adult age 
groups (25 to 64 years), Ukraine is not likely to counter the shrinking and aging labor force.  
Under all scenarios the labor force will shrink considerably in both age groups. 
 
Table 7. Projected changes in the Ukrainian labor force between 2010 and 2060 by 
scenario and age group 
Age 
group 
Indicator 
Projected changes in the Ukrainian labor force between 2010 and 2060 
Base 
scenario 
Scenario 
1 
Scenario 
2 
Scenario 
3 
Scenario 
4 
Scenario 
5 
15-39 
Absolute change 
(thousand) 
-4931.4 -4649.7 -3582.2 -4183.7 -4649.7 -3376.6 
 
Percentage 
change (%) 
-44.1 -41.6 -32.0 -37.4 -41.6 -30.2 
40-64 
Absolute change 
(thousand) 
-3463.3 -3106.5 -1601.3 -2747.1 -2354.9 -893.2 
 
Percentage 
change (%) 
-33.7 -30.2 -15.6 -26.7 -22.9 -8.7 
Source: Author’s calculations based on population projections from UN (2011) – medium variant 
– and labor force participation rates from ILO (2011) for ten five-year age groups. 
Note: Bars correspond to absolute changes in the labor force (left axis) and lines correspond to 
percentage changes (right axis). 
 
Yet the projected losses of the labor force as a percentage of its 2010 level are the lowest in the 
case of convergence to the best performing European countries (Scenarios 2 and 5).  From the 
comparison of the labor force participation rates under these two scenarios to those under the base 
scenario (Table A.2 in the Annex) follows that the largest adjustments will need to be made 
among older workers (50 years and older). 
To increase labor force participation in these age groups, it is important that older Ukrainians 
who want to work are not confronted with institutional and financial obstacles, in particular those 
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related to a mandatory retirement age and the pension system design.  Employers need to create 
more decent jobs for such workers, and the government needs to support creation of more of 
these jobs.  At the same time, it is necessary to implement measures to ensure that older workers 
are able to work longer and that their skills match the changing needs of the labor market. 
The labor force projections show that the impact of aging on the labor supply is so stark in 
Ukraine that even considerable increase in labor force participation rates will not help limit the 
absolute decline in the labor force.  Increasing immigration from younger countries could 
augment the labor force of the aging country (Chawla et al., 2007).  But it is quite unlikely that 
Ukraine will be able to attract skilled immigrant workers in large numbers as long as its richer 
neighbors such as Russia, Belarus, Poland or Hungary provide better employment and income 
opportunities for immigrant workers along with simpler rules of stay and work in these countries 
and more effective system of foreigners’ integration12.  At the same time, due to existing wage 
differentials and demand for foreign labor, particularly in the aging European countries and 
Russia, Ukraine loses thousands of its able-bodied workers annually as they head abroad in search 
of better jobs and better lives
13
.  Although international labor migration is likely to have positive 
effects on Ukraine's development through remittances, return migration, and Diaspora 
involvement, recent studies show that these effects have not been fully utilized in Ukraine so far 
(Malynovska, 2011; Kupets, 2012b; Poznyak, 2012). 
Scarce resources could be more efficiently used via internal migration of the labor force within 
the country.  But aging changes the age composition of population and makes the labor force 
less mobile, both professionally and geographically.  This creates a barrier to achieving the 
needed employment and productivity levels.  According to the recent study of internal labor 
mobility in Ukraine (Kupets, 2012a), teens and young adults (15-24 years) who predominantly 
migrate to pursue professional education and/or start families have the highest propensity to 
migrate within the country (Figure 9).  Young people made up almost a half of all internal 
residential migration flows in 2010, as opposed to 41.7 percent in 2002.  For comparison, the 
share of prime-age adults (25-59 years) who more often move for labor market reasons was 34.6 
percent in 2010, down from to 35.9 percent in 2002.  Besides, younger workers have much 
higher commuting rates, both within their region of residence and outside it, than their older 
counterparts. 
The spatial mobility of Ukrainians within the country is already low, inefficient, and constrained 
by many factors.  From the comparison of internal migration rates in Ukraine and other 
European countries done with controlling for the average size and number of geographical units 
follows that actual registered internal migration rates in Ukraine are about half of those that would 
be expected (World Bank, 2012b).  Not only actual migration rates are low when compared to 
other countries, but also intentions to migrate within the country.  According to the Life in 
Transition Survey in 2010, only 0.9 percent of Ukrainians answered positively when asked about 
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intentions to migrate internally in the next 12 months.  In view of high migration costs and other 
barriers to permanent residential migration, temporary labor migration and commuting becomes 
an increasingly important substitute to residential migration but these flows are often 
undocumented and biased to the capital city and the nearby region14.  Evidence also shows that 
some Ukrainians living in bordering regions are more inclined to find temporary employment 
abroad than within Ukraine as there is no sense in “trading bad for worse” by moving to some 
other part of Ukraine (Kupets, 2012a). 
 
Figure 9. Gross internal migration rates by age and sex, 2010 
 
Source: Figure 3.2 in Kupets (2012, a) based on population migration data of the State Statistics 
Service of Ukraine. 
Note: The gross migration rate shows the number of all documented migration flows within 
Ukraine in 2010 relative to the average annual de jure population for each sex and five-year age 
group. 
 
Taking into account that an older population is even less likely to migrate to find work and a 
better place to live in, Ukraine needs urgent solutions aimed at removing existing barriers to 
internal mobility to foster mobility of an aging population and to cushion the impact of 
demographic change on the labor market at least partially.  Addressing major bureaucratic and 
practical obstacles to efficient internal migration – cumbersome administrative procedures of 
registration at the place of residence (legacy of the old system of propiska), underdeveloped 
housing and credit markets, strong ties to home community and family, lack of appropriate skills 
and weak formal labor market institutions – will allow people to access more and better jobs in 
leading regions (World Bank, 2012b).  Establishing and maintaining an efficient road sector, 
especially by improving bad roads and infrastructure, shifting of transport services to more 
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environmentally friendly and safe modes and systems, ensuring access of the poor and vulnerable 
adults to affordable transport, considering age-specific transport needs in the planning and 
implementation of transport systems and urban development will necessarily entail an 
improvement in mobility and foster equitable development (BMZ, 2003). 
 
4.2 Necessary productivity improvements 
Analysis in the previous section shows that demographic changes make it increasingly difficult 
to continue improving the standard of living of Ukrainians through the labor supply side measures.  
Improvement in the living standards of Ukrainians will increasingly have to come from 
productivity growth.  Productivity improvements are essential for offsetting the quantity effects 
of smaller labor force and at least for maintaining living standards at the current level. 
 
Figure 10. Projected annual changes in labor productivity necessary to cushion the 
negative impact of aging on average income, 2011–2060 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on population projections from UN (2011) – medium variant 
– and age-specific labor force participation rates in 2010 from ILO (2011). 
Note: The simulation assesses changes in the labor productivity measured here as real GDP per 
person in the labor force necessary to maintain constant or increasing GDP per capita between 
2011 and 2060, given the expected decline in the labor force due to aging.  Age-specific labor 
force participation rates are assumed to be constant in 2011-2060 at the 2010 level.  The basic 
equation for simulation is the following: annual percentage change in GDP per person in the 
labor force is equal to the sum of annual percentage changes in GDP per capita and in the ratio 
of total population to the labor force.  Labor force is limited to the population aged 15-64 
years. 
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To assess the adjustments in labor productivity measured here as real GDP per person in the 
labor force necessary to cushion the impact of aging on average income, several simple 
simulations with three scenarios for GDP per capita changes and the assumption of constant 
age-specific labor force participation rates have been done (Figure 10).  In order to keep real 
GDP per capita constant (zero growth), labor productivity should grow on average by 0.5 percent 
annually during the next forty years, with a particularly pronounced growth needed in 2017-2023 
and 2037-2051.  If the goal is to reach a GDP per capita annual growth rate of 3 percent, the 
required productivity gain will be much more substantial (average annual growth of 3.5 percent in 
2011-2050). 
 
Figure 11. Real GDP and labor productivity growth rate, 1991–2011 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on World Development Indicators data on GDP at PPP (in 
constant 2005 international $), GDP per person employed (in constant 1990 PPP $) and total 
labor force. 
 
Hence, Ukraine needs to boost productivity growth significantly so that fewer workers could 
produce more goods and services and be better paid.  Although Ukraine had strong economic 
performance in terms of GDP and productivity growth in 2000-2008 (Figure 11), it was driven 
mainly by external and temporary factors such as a number of positive reforms, financial 
stabilization efforts and privatization of loss-making state-owned enterprises, positive terms of 
trade developments and fast-growing export prices, idle industrial capacity utilization without 
significant investments and innovation, a surge of capital inflows and credit growth fuelled by 
commercial banks’ external borrowing (World Bank, 2010).  However, these main drivers of 
growth in the pre-crisis period are not likely to persist in the same order of magnitude over the 
longer term, the channel of increasing output through increased capacity utilization is almost 
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
p
er
ce
n
t,
 Y
o
Y 
GDP GDP per person in the labor force GDP per person employed
124  O. KUPETS 
 
 
exhausted, and therefore other opportunities to sustain productivity growth should be extensively 
used. 
First of all, considerable changes in the government policies and institutions are needed to (i) 
remove obstacles to the free business entry/ exit, increase competition and favor production over 
diversionary activities, (ii) foster greater sophistication and diversification of Ukraine’s export 
basket, (iii) increase foreign and domestic investment to foster technology absorption, innovation 
and modernization, (iv) improve the quality of infrastructure and public services, particularly 
education and health care (World Bank, 2010).  At micro level, workplace productivity could be 
increased through building leadership and management capability, fostering a healthy workplace 
culture, encouraging innovation and exploiting technology, investing in people and skills, 
organizing productive workplaces, exchanging ideas and information with others in the industry 
and collaborating with them
15
. 
If the expected productivity gains do not materialize in Ukraine, the country will not be able to 
cushion the negative impact of aging on output and income, living standards of many Ukrainians 
will inevitably fall whereas public retirement schemes and the social welfare system will become 
unsustainable.  The inability of the state to provide pension and other benefits to an aging 
population can be a source of social tension stretching social cohesion to the limit (WDR, 2012c). 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Faced with a rapidly aging population, Ukraine must act immediately to address the existing 
jobs challenges by putting in place policies to boost productivity, support the participation of 
more working-able Ukrainians in the workforce, strengthen the economy and ensure long-term 
sustainability of public finances and social programs.  With an early intervention, the need to 
take drastic actions in the future such as significant tax increases or reductions in public spending 
may be avoided.  Furthermore, these policies may reinforce each other over time, and therefore 
the payoff from an early intervention is potentially very large. 
A prerequisite for Ukraine’s job policy is to create an environment conducive to higher 
productivity growth, job creation and reallocation starting from the fundamentals: ensuring 
macroeconomic and political stability, promoting the rule of law and protection of rights through 
an effective and de-politicized judicial system, improving the efficiency of the business tax 
system and functioning of capital markets, removing direct barriers to international trade and 
foreign investment, investing in a modern world-class infrastructure, and removing the other 
structural obstacles to doing business, investing, innovating, and creating more jobs in the formal 
sector.  Implementation of smaller-scale but well-targeted investment programs in the areas, 
activities and sectors that have the clear potential to expand the range of export capabilities of the 
Ukrainian economy, provide productivity spillovers, improve living standards, and enhance social 
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cohesion may be warranted.  The risk of capture by private interests should be minimized 
through mechanisms of accountability, transparency, and clear eligibility criteria. 
The current context of an aging society also calls for modernization of the education and 
training systems to equip people with broad, flexible, and transferable skills that would enable 
them to progress in their working lives and to adapt quickly to a rapidly changing economic 
environment.  Sound public policies aimed at improving health and nutrition of population in a 
cost-effective manner and providing additional resources to support basic research and education 
are also of critical importance for building up the human capital, increasing activity rates and 
improving productivity performance. 
In order to avoid the skills mismatches and labor underutilization that are especially unwelcome 
in an economy with a rapidly shrinking and aging population, effective labor policies and 
institutions should be set on a plateau, with addressing the labor market imperfections but without 
reducing efficiency.  It is important to improve labor market information and provide career 
guidance; remove excessive labor market rigidity supported by the outdated Labor Code 1971; 
encourage flexible work arrangements in the formal sector, including part-time work and 
telework; promote the geographical and occupational mobility of the workforce by addressing the 
institutional bottlenecks that affect mobility; strengthen the capacity of Public Employment 
Service and private employment agencies to better match workers to jobs that require the skills 
they actually possess; assist vulnerable people in finding a suitable job and fight discriminatory 
practices in hiring and pay; protect workers against the power of employers and intermediaries 
and provide more opportunities for voice. 
Finally, policymakers should remove the observed obstacles to creation of good jobs, given the 
country context.  In particular, it is necessary to develop a comprehensive approach to promoting 
active aging and extending working life careers as it has been recently done in many developed 
countries facing the aging challenge
16
.  Three broad areas where policy actions are necessary to 
encourage labor force participation among older workers include the following: 
 tackling employment barriers on the side of employers.  Labor-demand-side measures 
which are of critical importance in Ukraine may include reduced or reimbursed social 
security contributions for older workers, subsidized employment targeted specifically at the 
older age groups, reduced payment of sickness benefits by employers or other policy 
measures to decrease labor costs for them. Reforms of employment protection legislation 
which would liberalize hiring and dismissal of employees and would promote an age-neutral 
approach to collective dismissals; effective enforcement of labor legislation regarding the 
ban to put age limits in job offers and discriminate potential workers on the grounds of age; 
and the implementation of the age-awareness projects aimed at changing attitudes towards 
older workers and at decreasing existing prejudices among managers may be also useful to 
encourage an age-neutral approach in employers’ practices.  In addition, an institutional 
126  O. KUPETS 
 
 
obstacle that prevents many people from working after reaching a statutory retirement age 
should be revised to provide such workers with a variety of retirement transition options; 
 improving the employability of older workers.  First of all, it is necessary to strengthen the 
Public Employment Service and better align its information, occupational guidance and job 
placement services to the needs of older workers using the best practices of developed 
countries.  Older workers also need help in upgrading their skills to match the changing 
needs of the labor market, so the policy responses may include programs that offer training 
for older unemployed workers in market relevant skills.  An education and training benefit 
(voucher) which is introduced in Ukraine since January 1, 2013 according to the new Law 
On Employment is one of such programs.  It is designed to be provided to individuals aged 
45 years and more who have a social insurance period of at least 15 years.  Unlike standard 
labor market training provided by the Public Employment Service, it subsidizes training 
efforts while giving participants some freedom to choose the type of training that they want.  
Alternative policy measures may include programs that encourage employers to invest 
continuously in skills of their workers, including the elderly (lifelong learning schemes), and 
that provide effective instruments to validate skills acquired on the job.  Identifying sectors 
and firms where the skills and qualifications of older workers are very valuable and do not 
need significant upgrading (e.g. in health care, education, research and development, retail 
trade, transport and manufacturing) and matching jobseekers to such jobs may be also a right 
approach in the short term.  Taking into account poor health and premature mortality of 
Ukrainians that are often linked to poor working conditions and significant stress at work, it 
is important to implement effective policy measures aimed at improving the health status of 
individuals through positive changes in their life styles, reforms in the health care system and 
significant improvement of the quality of jobs in the Ukrainian labor market; 
 encouraging older workers to keep working longer.  Despite political speculations about the 
issue and strong opposition of population, Ukraine needs to adjust the age of retirement in 
accordance with changes in life expectancy and demographic trends, remove early 
retirement privileges for large groups of workers and tighten the conditions for 
unemployment pathways into retirement.  These changes may be effectively combined 
with financial incentives to undertake additional years of work which generally take the form 
of a percentage enhancing the pension of the older worker.  Many older workers would like 
to remain active longer but not necessarily in the form of traditional full-time employment, 
so age management policies adapting working conditions to changing needs and increasing 
part-time or distance work are of increasing importance.  At the same time, the government 
should ensure fair treatment between full-time and part-time workers and improve the 
working conditions of those taking non-standard employment in the formal sector. 
It is important to ensure that all these measures of active aging that often require significant 
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financing from the public and private funds do not crowd out the measures fostering employment 
of youth and other vulnerable categories of workers those effective implementation would also 
provide important gains in labor force participation needed to increase the labor supply.  As has 
been repeatedly stressed in this paper, the ultimate priority has to be placed on increases in labor 
productivity, professional and geographical labor mobility.  Since the option of offsetting some 
of the decline in the labor force and its aging through increased immigration of the skilled young 
workers is less feasible in Ukraine than in richer countries, more efforts should be spent on 
retaining Ukrainians at home and on increasing positive development effects from emigration of 
Ukrainian workers through remittances, return migration, and Diaspora involvement. 
 
Notes 
 
1
 This paper is based on the background paper by Olga Kupets, Volodymyr Vakhitov and Svitlana 
Babenko (2012) “Ukraine Case Study: Jobs and Demographic Change” prepared for the World 
Development Report 2013 on Jobs (see http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTNWDR2013/ 
Resources/8258024-1320950747192/8260293-1320956712276/8261091-1348683883703/WD
R2013_bp_Jobs_And_Demographic_Change.pdf) and its shorter revised version written by 
Olga Kupets for the WDR volume with country case studies.  The views expressed in this 
paper are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the institution with 
which the author is affiliated. 
2
 The source of data: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population 
Division (2011) World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision, New York. 
3
 Population aging is defined as the process by which the balance of a country’s population shifts 
such that the proportion of the population that is elderly constitutes a growing proportion when 
compared with younger ages (Chawla et al., 2007, p.47).  
4
 See United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2011) 
World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision, New York. 
5
 Cieslak (2004) described four basic types of population aging: (i) aging from below without 
compensation (constant mortality and declining fertility); (ii) aging from below with losses 
(increasing mortality and declining fertility); (iii) aging from above with compensation 
(declining mortality and constant fertility); and (iv) aging from below and above with 
compensation (declining mortality and fertility). 
6
 Employment is defined according to the ILO methodology on the basis of the Ukrainian Labor 
Force Survey (LFS) data and refers to individuals aged 15–70 years.  
7
 The typology refers to the characteristics of a person’s main or only job.  A wage employee is 
classified as a part-time employee if he/she usually works less than 30 hours per week in the 
main job.  Workers who were temporarily absent from their job and were not sure about the 
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possibility of returning to their employer in the next 6 months, are also classified as 
part-time/temporary workers.  As there is no information about the type of employment 
contract and its duration in the LFS, temporary workers were defined according to their answer 
about involvement in temporary or casual jobs during the reference week.  
8
 When discussing the quality of jobs based on the LFS data, we omit important information on 
wages and wage arrears, which is missing in the LFS.  There is no alternative data source in 
Ukraine except for the ULMS (Ukrainian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey) that would provide 
micro-level data on important job characteristics and wages simultaneously.  
9
 For this analysis, we used micro data from the Labor Force Survey (LFS) with a rotating panel.  
In the Ukrainian LFS, each sampled person was interviewed a maximum of six times: in three 
consecutive months of the year t and then in the same months of the year t+1.  It is therefore 
possible to compute year-to-year flow statistics comparing the labor market situation of the 
sample people in years t and t+1.  Selecting one observation per one person (first observation 
with a complete pair of year-to-year flows) and applying monthly weights for the base period, 
we calculated transition probabilities in the same manner as for the panel data utilizing 
Markovian flow analysis (Bellmann et al., 1995).  The transition probability from labor market 
status i in year t to labor market status j in year t+1 is equal to Pij=Fij/Si, where Fij stands for the 
number of individuals observed in status i in year t and in status j in year t+1, and Si is the stock 
of individuals in status i in the initial period.  The estimates are not corrected for the potential 
problems of attrition, misclassification, and round-tripping.  
10
 See Chapter 6 on Labor in World Bank (2012a).  
11
 Data and the methodological notes are available at: http://laborsta.ilo.org/applv8/data/EAPEP/ 
eapep_E.html.  
12
 According to the recently adopted State Programme of the Russian Federation On Employment 
Promotion (as of November 22, 2012), due to the main measures envisaged in the Programme’s 
subcomponent on International Labor Migration and allocation of about RUR 140 billion from 
the Federal budget during 2013-2020, Russia expects to increase substantially the inflow of 
highly skilled professionals from abroad and the total number of foreigners with work permits 
and patents to meet the needs of the Russian economy and to ensure positive net migration (see 
more at http://www.rosmintrud.ru/docs/government/90).  
13
 1.2 million, or 3.4 percent of the Ukrainian population aged 15-70, were identified as labor 
migrants from January 2010 until June 2012, according to the recent Labor Migration Survey 
2012, carried out by the State Statistics Service of Ukraine in the framework of the ILO-EU 
Project “Effective Governance of Labor Migration and its Skills Dimensions”, (http://eeas. 
europa.eu/delegations/ukraine/press_corner/all_news/news/2013/2013_05_31_2_en.htm).  
14
 Despite an increase in the commuting rate in Ukraine from 10.5 percent of total employment in 
2005 to 13.2 percent in 2010, it is still significantly lower than in the developed EU countries 
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(Kupets, 2012a).  
15
 See seven keys to workplace productivity identified by the New Zealand Department of Labor 
at http://www.dol.govt.nz/er/bestpractice/productivity/7drivers.asp.  
16
 See the OECD review of ageing and employment policies, recent reforms and measures to 
stimulate employment of older workers in 21 countries-members of the OECD at 
http://www.oecd.org/els/emp/ageingandemploymentpolicies.htm or the European Employment 
Observatory Review in 2012 devoted to Employment policies to promote active aging in 33 
European countries at http://www.eu-employment-observatory.net/explore.aspx?years=2012& 
keyword=Employment%20policies%20to%20promote%20active%20ageing.  
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Annex 
Table A.1. Marginal effects of the determinants of non-standard employment: 
Probit model 
 
2010 2004-2010 
 
dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. 
Women (Men) -0.048*** 0.002 -0.046*** 0.001 
Marital status (single) 
    Married 0.024*** 0.003 0.017*** 0.001 
Divorced 0.013*** 0.003 0.015*** 0.001 
Age group (15–24) 
    25–34 -0.034*** 0.004 -0.034*** 0.002 
35–44 -0.037*** 0.004 -0.044*** 0.002 
45–54 -0.055*** 0.004 -0.063*** 0.002 
55+ 0.002 0.004 0.010*** 0.002 
Education (basic secondary and 
lower) 
    General secondary -0.038*** 0.003 -0.033*** 0.001 
Post-secondary -0.045*** 0.004 -0.032*** 0.001 
Tertiary 0.009** 0.004 0.016*** 0.001 
Sector (agriculture) 
    Industry -0.384*** 0.004 -0.345*** 0.002 
Construction -0.022*** 0.006 -0.053*** 0.002 
Market services -0.277*** 0.005 -0.226*** 0.002 
Public services -0.272*** 0.004 -0.229*** 0.002 
Occupation (unskilled) 
    Skilled blue-collar -0.262*** 0.004 -0.276*** 0.001 
White-collar -0.351*** 0.004 -0.346*** 0.002 
Urban (rural) -0.054*** 0.002 -0.064*** 0.001 
Macro-region (Kyiv City) 
    North and Center 0.069*** 0.005 0.065*** 0.002 
East 0.033*** 0.005 0.032*** 0.002 
South 0.055*** 0.005 0.064*** 0.002 
West 0.109*** 0.005 0.093*** 0.002 
Year (2004) 
    2005 
  
-0.002 0.001 
2006 
  
-0.002 0.001 
2007 
  
0.002 0.001 
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2008 
  
0.004*** 0.001 
2009 
  
0.011*** 0.001 
2010 
  
0.017*** 0.001 
N 210,470 1,562,587 
Pseudo R
2
 0.357 0.356 
Source: Own calculations based on LFS data.  
Note: Marginal effects (dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level).  
Robust standard errors. 
Significance levels: *** significant at 1 percent; ** significant at 5 percent.  All variables are 
dummies; the base categories are in brackets. 
 
Table A.2. Projected age-specific labor force participation rates (both sexes) under 
alternative scenarios 
Age 
group 
Year 
Labor force participation rate (%) 
Base scenario Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5 
15-19 2010 33.4 33.4 33.4 33.4 33.4 33.4 
 2020 33.4 31.1 31.1 31.1 31.1 31.1 
 2060 33.4 31.1 51.0 35.0 31.1 49.5 
20-24 2010 46.1 46.1 46.1 46.1 46.1 46.1 
 2020 46.1 56.7 56.7 56.7 56.7 56.7 
 2060 46.1 56.7 77.5 64.0 56.7 78.6 
25-29 2010 79.9 79.9 79.9 79.9 79.9 79.9 
 2020 79.9 81.5 81.5 81.5 81.5 81.5 
 2060 79.9 81.6 87.8 89.2 81.6 90.7 
30-34 2010 84.5 84.5 84.5 84.5 84.5 84.5 
 2020 84.5 86.5 86.5 86.5 86.5 86.5 
 2060 84.5 86.6 90.8 90.0 86.6 95.1 
35-39 2010 84.9 84.9 84.9 84.9 84.9 84.9 
 2020 84.9 87.5 87.5 87.5 87.5 87.5 
 2060 84.9 87.6 91.9 90.0 87.6 95.9 
40-44 2010 85.6 85.6 85.6 85.6 85.6 85.6 
 2020 85.6 87.2 87.2 87.2 87.2 87.2 
 2060 85.6 87.3 91.7 89.0 87.3 95.3 
45-49 2010 83.7 83.7 83.7 83.7 83.7 83.7 
 2020 83.7 86.2 86.2 86.2 86.2 86.2 
 2060 83.7 86.3 91.5 87.0 86.3 94.4 
50-54 2010 77.2 77.2 77.2 77.2 77.2 77.2 
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 2020 77.2 79.9 79.9 79.9 79.9 79.9 
 2060 77.2 80.1 89.8 82.0 80.1 92.5 
55-59 2010 50.4 50.4 50.4 50.4 50.4 50.4 
 2020 50.4 55.7 55.7 55.7 55.7 55.7 
 2060 50.4 56.9 86.5 68.3 71.6 92.4 
60-64 2010 29.9 29.9 29.9 29.9 29.9 29.9 
 2020 29.9 34.5 34.5 34.5 34.5 34.5 
 2060 29.9 35.0 68.1 38.9 64.0 91.4 
Source: Author’s calculations based on population projections from UN (2011) – medium variant 
– and labor force participation rates from ILO (2011). 
 
 
